Abstract
This paper presents a sequential model of bargaining based on abductive reasoning in ASP. We assume that each agent is represented by a logic program that encodes the background knowledge of the agent. Each agent has a set of goals to achieve but these goals are normally unachievable without an agreement from the other agent. We design an alternating-offers procedure that shows how an agreement between two agents can be reached through a reasoning process based on answer set programming and abduction. We prove that the procedure converges to a Nash equilibrium if each player makes rational offer/counter-offer at each round.
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grants 61003203 and 61262029.
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Chen, W., Zhang, D., Wu, M. (2013). A Sequential Model for Reasoning about Bargaining in Logic Programs. In: Cabalar, P., Son, T.C. (eds) Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. LPNMR 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8148. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40564-8_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40564-8_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40563-1
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