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A Unified Epistemic Analysis of Iterated Elimination Algorithms from Regret Viewpoint

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8196))

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Abstract

In this paper, we re-explain four types of players’ rationality from the viewpoint of strategy-choosing regret, and we provide a unified logic of epistemic characterization of the four iterated elimination algorithms IESD (Iterated Elimination Strictly Dominated strategy), Rationalizablity (also called iterated elimination strategies that are never best responses), IA (Iterated Admissibility) and IERS (Iterated Elimination Regret-dominated Strategy). The unified characterization extends van Benthem’s work of linking game theory with epistemic logic and provides further insights into exploring the rationale of these iterated eliminating algorithms. In addition, to clarify the proof-theoretic principles assumed in players’ reasoning, we also develop an axiomatic presentation for our results.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Logic and Cognition, Philosophy Department, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275, China

    Jianying Cui & Xudong Luo

Authors
  1. Jianying Cui
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  2. Xudong Luo
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Ashton Building, Ashton Street, L69 3BX, Liverpool, UK

    Davide Grossi

  2. Fakultät für Philosophie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1, 80539, München, Germany

    Olivier Roy

  3. Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, Zhejiang University, Xixi Campus, Tianmushan Road 148, 310028,, Hangzhou, China

    Huaxin Huang

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Cui, J., Luo, X. (2013). A Unified Epistemic Analysis of Iterated Elimination Algorithms from Regret Viewpoint. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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