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Reliability Weighted Voting Games

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Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 8146))

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Abstract

We examine agent failures in weighted voting games. In our cooperative game model, R-WVG, each agent has a weight and a survival probability, and the value of an agent coalition is the probability that its surviving members would have a total weight exceeding a threshold. We propose algorithms for computing the value of a coalition, finding stable payoff allocations, and estimating the power of agents. We provide simulation results showing that on average the stability level of a game increases as the failure probabilities of the agents increase. This conforms to several recent results showing that failures increase stability in cooperative games.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK

    Yoram Bachrach

  2. Carnegie Mellon University, USA

    Nisarg Shah

Authors
  1. Yoram Bachrach
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  2. Nisarg Shah
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

    Berthold Vöcking

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Bachrach, Y., Shah, N. (2013). Reliability Weighted Voting Games. In: Vöcking, B. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8146. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41391-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41392-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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