Abstract
Security of various types of online auctions has received a considerable attention from researchers. However, very few works have analyzed the problem of security in online sealed-bid auctions from the point of view of rational participants. The paper deals with an online auction scenario where two types of participants co-exist: 1) a party corrupted by a rational adversary that have positive utilities from information gained and that has no valuation for the items on auction enabling them to bid arbitrarily and 2) rational parties that are privacy conscious, positively value information gain and have a valuation for items on auction. The secure auction protocol proposed here addresses 1) privacy concerns of the rational players from themselves as well as the rational adversary; 2) prevention of ‘throwing away’ of contracts by rational adversaries and 3) prevention of sellers from obtaining their copy of the contract while winners do not receive theirs.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bogetoft, P., Damgård, I.B., Jakobsen, T., Nielsen, K., Pagter, J.I., Toft, T.: A practical implementation of secure auctions based on multiparty integer computation. In: Di Crescenzo, G., Rubin, A. (eds.) FC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4107, pp. 142–147. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Bradford, P.G., Park, S., Rothkopf, M.H., Park, H.: Protocol completion incen-tive problems in cryptographic Vickrey auctions. Electronic Commerce Research 8(1-2), 57–77 (2008)
Franklin, M.K., Reiter, M.K.: The design and implementation of a secure auction service. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 22(5), 302–312 (1996)
Fuchsbauer, G., Katz, J., Naccache, D.: Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks. In: Micciancio, D. (ed.) TCC 2010. LNCS, vol. 5978, pp. 419–436. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited. In: De Prisco, R., Yung, M. (eds.) SCN 2006. LNCS, vol. 4116, pp. 229–241. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Groce, A., Katz, J., Thiruvengadam, A., Zikas, V.: Byzantine agreement with a rational adversary. In: Czumaj, A., Mehlhorn, K., Pitts, A., Wattenhofer, R. (eds.) ICALP 2012, Part II. LNCS, vol. 7392, pp. 561–572. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2004, pp. 623–632. ACM, New York (2004)
Juels, A., Szydlo, M.: A two-server, sealed-bid auction protocol. In: Blaze, M. (ed.) FC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2357, pp. 72–86. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for exchanging information. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2008, pp. 423–432. ACM, New York (2008)
Miltersen, P.B., Nielsen, J.B., Triandopoulos, N.: Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 541–558. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Naor, M., Pinkas, B., Sumner, R.: Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 129–139. ACM (November 1999)
Parkes, D.C., Rabin, M.O., Thorpe, C.: Cryptographic combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. In: Dingledine, R., Golle, P. (eds.) FC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5628, pp. 305–324. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Suzuki, K., Yokoo, M.: Secure generalized Vickrey auction using homomorphic encryption. In: Wright, R.N. (ed.) FC 2003. LNCS, vol. 2742, pp. 239–249. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
De, S.J., Pal, A.K. (2013). Auctions with Rational Adversary. In: Bagchi, A., Ray, I. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8303. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45204-8_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45204-8_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-45203-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45204-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)