Abstract
Basic features of a classical cellular automaton (CA) are:
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Cells are arranged in a regular D-dimensional grid.
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Every cell adopts a state from afinite set of states.
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Time is discrete.
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Cells change their states according to local rules.
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The same transition rules apply to all cells.
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In each period cells are updated (simultaneously /sequentially).
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Hegselmann, R., Flache, A., Möller, V. (2000). Cellular Automata as a Modelling Tool: Solidarity and Opinion Formation. In: Suleiman, R., Troitzsch, K.G., Gilbert, N. (eds) Tools and Techniques for Social Science Simulation. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51744-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51744-0_9
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