Abstract
Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) is the most widely deployed interior gateway routing protocol on the Internet. We here present an approach to detect the attacks to which OSPF is vulnerable. As security feature, OSPF uses “fight-back” mechanism to detect false LSA flooded in network and take appropriate action. But few attacks have been proposed which bypass/overtake this mechanism to inject false LSA. And few attacks that are out of range of this mechanism. We will try to implement our approach to detect and mitigate these attacks. This approach is reactive so it may take small interval of time to detect and recover network from attack but is effective in doing so and securing the infrastructure.
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Sangroha, D., Gupta, V. (2014). Analyzer Router: An Approach to Detect and Recover from OSPF Attacks. In: Mauri, J.L., Thampi, S.M., Rawat, D.B., Jin, D. (eds) Security in Computing and Communications. SSCC 2014. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 467. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44966-0_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44966-0_36
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-44965-3
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