Abstract
Every belief has a life that goes from the agent having the belief now, the transmission of the belief to other agents, and the persistence of the belief through time. In this article we propose the idea that the belief can be said to be successful in relation to any of these respects. We will call them, respectively, the first, second, and third person perspective on knowledge and investigate the requisite properties of these three perspectives.
We do not base our approach on the notion of truth as is common, or on the notion of justification, which is another basis. Our concern is not with knowledge as corresponding to truth but knowledge as corresponding to stable belief.
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Ginés, A.S., Parikh, R. (2015). A Pragmatistic Approach to Propositional Knowledge Based on the Successful Behavior of Belief. In: Banerjee, M., Krishna, S.N. (eds) Logic and Its Applications. ICLA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8923. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45824-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45824-2_10
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