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Informational Dynamics of ‘Might’ Assertions

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 9394))

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Abstract

We investigate, in a logical setting, the proposal that assertion primarily functions to express and coordinate doxastic states and that ‘might’ fundamentally expresses lack of belief. We provide a formal model of an agent’s doxastic state and precise assertability conditions for an associated formal language. We thereby prove that an arbitrary assertion (including a complex of ‘might’ and ‘factual’ claims) always succeeds in expressing a well-defined doxastic state. We then propose a fully general and intuitive doxastic update operation as a model of an agent coming to accept an arbitrary assertion. We provide reduction axioms for some novel update operations related to this proposal.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, 450 Serra Mall, Building 90, Standford, CA, 94305, USA

    Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld

Authors
  1. Peter Hawke
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  2. Shane Steinert-Threlkeld
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter Hawke .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept of Comp Sci, Univ of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom

    Wiebe van der Hoek

  2. Department of Philosophy, Group in Logic & the Methodology of Sci. University of California, Berkeley, California, USA

    Wesley H. Holliday

  3. Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan

    Wen-fang Wang

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Hawke, P., Steinert-Threlkeld, S. (2015). Informational Dynamics of ‘Might’ Assertions. In: van der Hoek, W., Holliday, W., Wang, Wf. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9394. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_12

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48560-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48561-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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