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Automated Verification of Electrum Wallet

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9604))

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Abstract

We introduce a formal modeling in ASLan++ of the two-factor authentication protocol used by the Electrum Bitcoin wallet. This allows us to perform an automatic analysis of the wallet and show that it is secure for standard scenarios in Dolev Yao model [Dolev 1981]. The result could be derived thanks to some advanced features of the protocol analyzer such as the possibility to specify (i) new intruder deduction rules with clauses and (ii) non-deducibility constraints.

This work has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 645865-SPOOC).

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA Nancy–Grand Est, Villers-lès-Nancy, France

    Mathieu Turuani & Michael Rusinowitch

  2. Electrum Technologies GmbH, Berlin, Germany

    Thomas Voegtlin

Authors
  1. Mathieu Turuani
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  2. Thomas Voegtlin
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  3. Michael Rusinowitch
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mathieu Turuani .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Concordia University, Montreal, Québec, Canada

    Jeremy Clark

  2. University College London, London, United Kingdom

    Sarah Meiklejohn

  3. Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y.A. Ryan

  4. Rice University, Houston, Texas, USA

    Dan Wallach

  5. Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany

    Michael Brenner

  6. New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Kurt Rohloff

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© 2016 International Financial Cryptography Association

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Turuani, M., Voegtlin, T., Rusinowitch, M. (2016). Automated Verification of Electrum Wallet. In: Clark, J., Meiklejohn, S., Ryan, P., Wallach, D., Brenner, M., Rohloff, K. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9604. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-53356-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-53357-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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