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Relief Maximization and Rationality

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 10455))

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Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of relief maximization in decisions and games and shows how it can explain experimental behavior, such as asymmetric dominance and decoy effects. Next, two possible evolutionary explanations for the survival of relief-based behavior are sketched.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The symmetric games presented there are actually six, but one of them is irrelevant for our study. As usual, since games are symmetric, it suffices to specify row player’s payoffs.

  2. 2.

    For a (compact convex) set of probabilities \(\Gamma \subseteq \varDelta (A_{-i})\), it is also straightforward to generalize the definition to the “multiple-prior version” of relief maximization: \(\arg \max _{a_{i}}\min _{P\in \Gamma }\,\{\mathbb {E}_{P}\left[ u_{i}(a_{i},a_{-i})\right] -\min _{a_{i}'}\mathbb {E}_{P}\left[ u_{i}(a_{i}',a_{-i})\right] \}\).

  3. 3.

    Note that in general a tie-breaker is needed for a principle to always output a single action.

References

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  3. Galeazzi, P., Franke, M., Representations, S.: Rationality and evolution in a richer environment. Philos. Sci. (2017, forthcoming)

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Correspondence to Paolo Galeazzi .

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Galeazzi, P., Terzopoulou, Z. (2017). Relief Maximization and Rationality. In: Baltag, A., Seligman, J., Yamada, T. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10455. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_50

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_50

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55664-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-55665-8

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