Abstract
We deal with networks in which there are more than one arc connecting two nodes. These multiple arcs connecting two nodes are labeled in order to differentiate each other. Likewise, there is traffic or flow among the nodes of the network. The links can have different meanings as such roads, wire connections or social relationships; and the traffic can be for example passengers, information or commodities. When we consider that labels of a network are controlled or owned by different agents then we can analyze how the worth (cost, profit, revenues, power...) associated with the network can be allocated to the agents. The Shapley quota allocation mechanism is proposed and characterized by using reasonable properties. Finally, in order to illustrate the advantages of this approach and the Shapley quota allocation mechanism, an application to the case of the Metropolitan Consortium of Seville is outlined.
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Notes
- 1.
The difference of two sets A and B in the definition of \(f''(r)\) is as follows: \(A-B = A \setminus (A \cap B)\).
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First of all, the authors thank two anonymous referees for her/his helpful comments and suggestions to improve the contents of the paper. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (MCIU), the Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) and the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) under the project PGC2018-097965-B-I00 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Algaba, E., Fragnelli, V., Llorca, N., Sánchez-Soriano, J. (2019). Labeled Network Allocation Problems. An Application to Transport Systems. In: Nguyen, N., Kowalczyk, R., Mercik, J., Motylska-Kuźma, A. (eds) Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXIV. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11890. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60555-4_7
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