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Lost in Transmission: Investigating Filtering of COVID-19 Websites

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12675))

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Abstract

After the unprecedented arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Internet has become a crucial source of essential information on the virus. To prevent the spread of misinformation and panic, many authorities have resorted to exercising higher control over Internet resources. Although there is anecdotal evidence that websites containing information about the pandemic are blocked in specific countries, the global extent of these censorship efforts is unknown. In this work, we perform the first global censorship measurement study of websites obtained from search engine queries on COVID-19 information in more than 180 countries. Using two remote censorship measurement techniques, Satellite and Quack, we collect more than 67 million measurements on the DNS and Application layer blocking of 1,291 domains containing COVID-19 information from 49,245 vantage points in 5,081 ASes. Analyzing global patterns, we find that blocking of these COVID-19 websites is relatively low—on average, 0.20%–0.34% of websites containing information about the pandemic experience interference. As expected, we see higher blocking in countries known for censorship such as Iran, China, and Kazakhstan. Surprisingly, however, we also find significant blocking of websites containing information about the pandemic in countries generally considered as “free” in the Internet space, such as Switzerland (DNS), Croatia (DNS), and Canada (Application layer). We discover that network filters in these countries flag many websites related to COVID-19 as phishing or malicious and hence restrict access to them. However, our investigation suggests that this categorization may be incorrect—most websites do not contain serious security threats—causing unnecessary blocking. We advocate for stricter auditing of filtering policies worldwide to help prevent the loss of access to relevant information.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank the shepherd Philipp Winter and the reviewers for their constructive feedback. We also thank Prerana Shenoy for her help with data analysis. This work was supported in part by research credits from Google.

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Correspondence to Roya Ensafi .

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Classifier and Manual Categorizations. Table 5 shows the results of the categorization of the 46 domains blocked by the Fortinet filter in Switzerland and Croatia using different categorization tools.

Table 5. URL Classifier and Manual Categories—NTE stands for Navigation Time Exceeded, E stands for error and NC stands for not categorized.

Appendix 2

Search Engine Crawl Keywords. Table 6 shows the list of prefix and suffix combinations used to construct the keywords used for our search engine crawls.

Table 6. Keyword permutations used for search engine crawls—Three terms (corona virus, covid virus, and covid-19 virus) are excluded from the table.

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Vyas, A., Sundara Raman, R., Ceccio, N., Lutscher, P.M., Ensafi, R. (2021). Lost in Transmission: Investigating Filtering of COVID-19 Websites. In: Borisov, N., Diaz, C. (eds) Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12675. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_22

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