Experiences in the Formal Analysis of the Group Domain of Interpretation Protocol (GDOI)

Abstract

Although research in the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis has been growing rapidly, it has of yet had little influence on the design and implementation of protocols intended for actual use. This is not because the designers of cryptographic protocols do not recognize the important of assurance, but rather seems the result of the fact that currently there are no good pathways for introducing formal analysis into the design process. In this paper we describe how we are attempting to help remedy this lack by working with the MSec working group in the Internet Engineering Task Force on the design and analysis of the Group Domain of Interpretation Protocol (GDOI), a secure multicast protocol intended to work with the Internet Key Exchange protocol. The purpose of our work has been two-fold: first, to identify and correct errors and ambiguities early on, and secondly to speed up the standardization process by providing increased evidence of GDOI’s soundness. In this paper we give a brief description of our ongoing work in the analysis of GDOI, and point both the benefits realized by the analysis and some of the open questions that raised by our experiences.