Abstract
This paper aims to show what makes coherentism as an epistemological position attractive in comparison to its main competitor, foundationalism. It also aims to show that, from a general epistemological point of view, constraint satisfaction is not the most attractive way to give content to the notion of coherence. In order to achieve these purposes, the paper distinguishes between epistemic, constructive and integrated coherentism. Epistemic coherentism treats coherence as a test for knowledge about a world which exists independently (ontological realism). Constructive coherentism uses coherence as a standard to determine what the facts are in a particular domain. This is a form of ontological idealism.
Usually, both epistemic and constructive coherentism apply the coherence test to only part of the positions (beliefs etc.) which a person accepts. The definition of, and standards for coherence, just as usually logic and standards for belief revision, are kept outside the process of making a position set coherent. Integrated coherentism differs by including everything in the coherence creating process. A set of positions is integratedly coherent if and only if it satisfies the standards included in the set of positions itself.
The paper argues that integrated coherentism best fits with the ideas underlying coherentism and that, as a general epistemological theory, it is incompatible with coherence as constraint satisfaction in a strict sense.
Jaap Hage thanks Michal Araszkiewicz, Gustavo Arosenema, Bartosz Brozek, Jaakko Husa and the (other) participants of the discussion meeting in Kraków on this paper for useful comments on a draft version. The responsibility for errors remains complete his own, or course.
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Notes
- 1.
Arguably, this version of foundationalism is a form of empirical foundationalism. Other forms of epistemic foundationalism are also possible, as Araszkiewicz pointed out to me.
- 2.
This example derives from Sosa (1991a).
- 3.
I adapted this characterisation of realism from Devitt (1991, 13–17). The adaptation consist in replacing the epistemic notions ‘belief’ and ‘think’ by the more comprehensive internalist notion ‘propositional attitude’. The reason for this move lies in the step which I will argue in Sect. 1.5.1, namely the replacement of ‘belief’ by ‘position’.
- 4.
It is also possible to combine the positions, and to be satisfied that there is no connection between a belief being justified as true, and the actual truth of the belief.
- 5.
The beginning of an argument can be found in Hage (2005, 35–43).
- 6.
The term ‘quasi-realism’ has already been taken by Blackburn. See Blackburn (1984, 180).
- 7.
See also the contribution of Bermejo to the present volume.
- 8.
Cf. . Downloaded on December 27, 2011.
- 9.
This example illustrates that the step from being more coherent to being more justified is not an obvious one, at least not in Dancy’s eyes.
- 10.
A splendid example of such coherentist foundationalism is Susan Haack’s ‘foundherentism’ (Haack 2009).
- 11.
Legal decisions (e.g. convict the suspect) can both be seen as behaviour, in which case it is not amenable to acceptance and as a judgement about what should be done (the suspect should be convicted), in which case it is a potential position.
- 12.
An interesting line of thinking would be to explore what the implications are if one adopts that position sets can also be held by social groups, or for instance by ‘physical science’ or ‘legal doctrine’. I owe this suggestion to Gustavo Arosenema. Popper’s work on ‘world 3’ (Popper 1972, Chaps. 3 and 4) goes in the same direction.
- 13.
A possible explanation of this use of the term ‘justified’ is reluctance against the use of ‘true’ for sentences for the topic of which one uses a constructivist approach. Truth would then be confined to domains for which one adopts realism, and ‘justified’ for constructivist domains. This usage has the disadvantage that it gives the word ‘justified’ a double role. Namely to stand for a person being justified in doing something, and as a counterpart for ‘true’.
- 14.
This should be read as ‘irrelevant from an argumentation-technical point of view’. The only thing that is really relevant for the truth of a conclusion is whether this conclusion corresponds with the facts. But that has nothing to do with the argument from which the conclusion follows.
- 15.
This may be interpreted as a reason why justification on the deductive account of it is global too. But then the global nature does not lie in the deductively valid argument itself, but in the justification of the premises.
- 16.
In fact, it is even more complicated, because apart from reasons against a position, there may be reasons why the reasons for adoption are in general not reasons after all, or are excluded in this special case. More details on the ‘logic of reasons’ in Hage (1997, Chap. 4), and in Hage (2005, Chap. 3).
- 17.
Notice that the contents of a position set determine what should be added, removed or changed. The position set itself does not lead to the required modifications. Moreover, the definition of integrated coherence does not state anything about the way an integratedly coherent set should be arrived at. It only provides a test on a position set to determine whether it is coherent.
- 18.
This may even be so by definition, if easy cases are defined as those cases which lead to agreement amongst those who argue by the rules of law. This position was argued in Hage et al. (1994). Presently I am less convinced of this position than I was then.
- 19.
This comes near to Pierce’s circumscription of truth: ‘Truth, what can this possibly mean except it be that there is one destined upshot to enquiry with reference to the question in hand.’ Quotation taken from Kirkham (1992, 81).
- 20.
An integratedly coherent position set should contain everything which should be accepted in the light of what else is accepted. Probably this involves the logical closure of the position set, and logical closure under deduction means infinitely large.
- 21.
- 22.
My views on legal method are exposed more extensively in Hage (2011).
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Hage, J. (2013). Three Kinds of Coherentism. In: Araszkiewicz, M., Šavelka, J. (eds) Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 107. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0_1
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