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A Complete Anti-collusion Mechanism in Blockchain

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Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1267))

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Abstract

Collusion attack is an issue existing in most blockchains, especially for token-based decentralized applications using voting as consensus mechanism and incentive method. Malicious users may collude others to get more votes, in order to get rewards. We present a complete anti-collusion mechanism (CACM), aiming to cheat the malicious users who want to collude others. Each vote will be committed on smart contract and consumes the commitment for last vote. Zero knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (zkSNARKs) is used to ensure the correctness of the voting and tallying operations in CACM. We implement CACM on the Ethereum test network, and the CACM circuit on local machine. The experiments show the low cost of time and gas respectively in generating zkSNARKs proof and interactions with smart contract, which proves CACM is efficient.

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Acknowledgments

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 91748107), Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation (No. 2020A1515010616), Guangdong Innovative Research Team Program (No. 2014ZT05G157).

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Correspondence to Xiangbin Xian .

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Xian, X., Yang, Z., Zhang, G., de Nelio S., T.M., Liu, W. (2020). A Complete Anti-collusion Mechanism in Blockchain. In: Zheng, Z., Dai, HN., Fu, X., Chen, B. (eds) Blockchain and Trustworthy Systems. BlockSys 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1267. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9213-3_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9213-3_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-15-9212-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-15-9213-3

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