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The Framework of Consensus Equilibria for Gap Games in Blockchain Ecosystems

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Blockchain and Trustworthy Systems (BlockSys 2020)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1267))

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to establish the general framework of consensus equilibria for Mining Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems, and in particular to explain the stable in the sense for the existence of consensus equilibria related to mining gap game’s behaviors by using one new concept called “Consensus Games” under the environment of Blockchain Ecosystems, where, the Blockchain Ecosystem mainly means the economic activities by taking into the account of three fundamental factors which are “Expenses, Reward Mechanism and Mining Power” for the work on blockschain by applying the key consensus called “Proof of Work” due to Nakamoto in 2008 and related ones.

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The Acknowledgements

All authors thank the professional service and hardwork provided by the organization committee for Blocksys’2020. This research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant numbers U1811462 and 11501349.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, 214122, China

    Lan Di

  2. Business School, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, 510275, China

    Fan Wang, Lijian Wei & George Yuan

  3. School of Fintech, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai, 201209, China

    George Yuan

  4. BBD Technology Co., Ltd. (BBD), No. 966, Tianfu Avenue, Chengdu, 610093, China

    George Yuan & Tu Zeng

  5. Business School, Chengdu University, Chengdu, 610106, China

    Qianyou Zhang

  6. Military Science Press, Military Academy of Science, Xianghongqi, Haidian District, Beijing, 100091, China

    Xiaojing Zhang

Authors
  1. Lan Di
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  2. Fan Wang
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  3. Lijian Wei
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  4. George Yuan
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  5. Tu Zeng
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  6. Qianyou Zhang
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  7. Xiaojing Zhang
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to George Yuan or Qianyou Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

    Zibin Zheng

  2. Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau, China

    Hong-Ning Dai

  3. Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming, China

    Xiaodong Fu

  4. Dali University, Dali, China

    Benhui Chen

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Di, L. et al. (2020). The Framework of Consensus Equilibria for Gap Games in Blockchain Ecosystems. In: Zheng, Z., Dai, HN., Fu, X., Chen, B. (eds) Blockchain and Trustworthy Systems. BlockSys 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1267. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9213-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9213-3_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-15-9212-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-15-9213-3

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