Abstract
Protocol Derivation System (PDS) supports syntactic derivations of complex protocols that use cryptographic primitives. However, the PDS is only applicable for two-party interaction protocols, which does not involve in the presence of a Trusted Third Party. In this paper, we proposed an extended PDS that can support key agreement protocols using a Trusted Thirty Party by adding some components, refinements, transformations and removing redundancy rules. A flow chart of deriving security protocols based on the extended PDS is given. The flow chart consists of two layers, the first layer is to get a raw protocol using components, refinements, transformations, the second layer is to remove superfluous protocol steps and improve protocol efficiency by removing redundancy rules. Finally, we get the AOR protocol as an example to illustrate how to derive a security protocol based on the extended PDS.
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Acknowledgements
This work is supported by following projects: The National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61962020 and No.61562026, the Jiangxi Province Key Subject Academic and Technical Leader Funding Project under Grant No. 2017XSDTR0105.
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Yang, K., Xiao, M., Song, Z., Ouyang, R. (2021). Deriving Security Protocols Based on Protocol Derivation System. In: He, K., Zhong, C., Cai, Z., Yin, Y. (eds) Theoretical Computer Science. NCTCS 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1352. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1877-2_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1877-2_12
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