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Secure EHR Sharing Scheme Based on Limited Sanitizable Signature

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Frontiers in Cyber Security (FCS 2022)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1726))

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Abstract

Many sanitizable signature schemes have been proposed to facilitate and secure the secondary use of medical data. These schemes allow a patient, authorized by the doctor, to modify and re-sign his/her electronic health record (EHR) to hide sensitive information and the new signature can be verified successfully. However, this may lead to fraud because patients may forge medical records for profit. To further standardize sanitization and reduce the sanitizers power, this paper proposes a new limited sanitizable signature scheme, which allows the signer to not only decide which message blocks can be modified but also determine the maximum of modifiable blocks and the expiration time for sanitization. We also propose a secure EHR sharing scheme suitable for medical scenarios based on the above limited sanitizable signature to realize privacy preserving medical data sharing. Finally, the security analysis and experimental results show that the security and efficiency of our scheme can be accepted.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    \(\textbf{Redact}\) in [20] is also responsible for modifying the message m based on the MOD, but it allows to remove blocks rather than change, and can be considered a special case of \(\textbf{Sanit}\).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Information Security of Network Systems, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, 350108, China

    Yang Yang & Minming Huang

  2. College of Computer and Data Science, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, 350108, China

    Yang Yang, Bixia Yi, Yonghua Zhan & Minming Huang

Authors
  1. Yang Yang
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  2. Bixia Yi
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  3. Yonghua Zhan
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  4. Minming Huang
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Correspondence to Yang Yang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana

    Emmanuel Ahene

  2. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

    Fagen Li

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Yang, Y., Yi, B., Zhan, Y., Huang, M. (2022). Secure EHR Sharing Scheme Based on Limited Sanitizable Signature. In: Ahene, E., Li, F. (eds) Frontiers in Cyber Security. FCS 2022. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1726. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8445-7_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-8445-7_19

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-19-8444-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-19-8445-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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