Abstract
Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) realizes efficient update and search operations for encrypted databases, and there has been an increase in this line of research in the recent decade. Dynamic SSE allows the leakage of insignificant information to ensure efficient search operations, and it is important to understand and identify what kinds of information are insignificant. In this paper, we propose an efficient dynamic SSE scheme Laura under the small leakage, which leads to appealing security requirements such as forward privacy, (Type-II) backward privacy, and result hiding. Laura is constructed based on \(\textsf{Aura}\) (NDSS 2021) and is almost as efficient as \(\textsf{Aura}\) while only allowing less leakage than \(\textsf{Aura}\). We also provide experimental results to show the concrete efficiency of Laura.
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Notes
- 1.
Though the server needs to send the AMQ structure to the client during the search operation, the size of the structure is reasonably small. For example, if we select the cuckoo filter [15] as the AMQ structure, its size is 0.79 MB for 100,000 deleted entries with the false-positive probability \(p= 10^{-4}\). As a reference, according to the \(\textsf{Aura}\) paper [25], \(\textsf{SD}_{d}\) [12] requires 8,58 MB of total communication costs for search.
- 2.
To be precise, \(\textsf{S}\) has to change the way to retrieve ciphertexts depending on \(\textsf{SP}^{( t )}_{ q }\); \(\textsf{S}\) first retrieves ciphertexts re-added at the last search for q, i.e., at \(t' = \max \textsf{SP}^{( t )}_{ q }\), and then retrieves ciphertexts simulated from \(t'\) to t.
- 3.
We did not implement sOurs since we want to compare dynamic SSE schemes with the same security level. Note that \(\textsf {s}{\text {-}}\textsf {Laura}\) is secure even if deleted entries are re-added.
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Acknowledgment
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP21H03395, JP21H03441, JP22H03590, JP23H00468, JP23H00479, JP23K17455, JST CREST JPMJCR23M2, and MEXT Leading Initiative for Excellent Young Researchers.
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A Formal Description of \(\textsf {s}{\text {-}}\textsf {Laura}\)
A Formal Description of \(\textsf {s}{\text {-}}\textsf {Laura}\)
We give the concrete procedures of \(\textsf {s}{\text {-}}\textsf {Laura}\) in Figs. 10 and 11.
\(\textsf{Setup}\) and \(\textsf{Update}\) of our dynamic SSE scheme \(\textsf {s}{\text {-}}\textsf {Laura}\).
\(\textsf{Search}\) of our dynamic SSE scheme \(\textsf {s}{\text {-}}\textsf {Laura}\).
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Amada, T., Iwamoto, M., Watanabe, Y. (2024). Efficient Result-Hiding Searchable Encryption with Forward and Backward Privacy. In: Seo, H., Kim, S. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2023. ICISC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14562. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-1238-0_10
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