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Non-malleable Codes from Authenticated Encryption in Split-State Model

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Applications and Techniques in Information Security (ATIS 2022)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1804))

Abstract

The secret key of any encryption scheme that are stored in secure memory of the hardwired devices can be tampered using fault attacks. The usefulness of tampering attack is to recover the key by altering some regions of the memory. Such attack may also appear when the device is stolen or viruses has been introduced. Non-malleable codes are used to protect the secret information from tampering attacks. The secret key can be encoded using non-malleable codes rather than storing it in plain form. An adversary can apply some arbitrary tampering function on the encoded message but it guarantees that output is either completely unrelated or original message. In this work, we propose a computationally secure non-malleable code from leakage resilient authenticated encryption along with 1-more extractable hash function in split-state model with no common reference string (CRS) based trusted setup. Earlier constructions of non-malleable code cannot handle the situation when an adversary has access to some arbitrary decryption leakage (i.e., during decoding of the codeword) function to get partial information about the codeword. In this scenario, the proposed construction is capable of handling such decryption leakages along with tampering attacks.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    |m|, |k| denote the message length and security parameter respectively.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, IIT Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India

    Anit Kumar Ghosal & Dipanwita Roychowdhury

Authors
  1. Anit Kumar Ghosal
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  2. Dipanwita Roychowdhury
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Correspondence to Anit Kumar Ghosal .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Karnataka, India

    Srikanth Prabhu

  2. Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Shiva Raj Pokhrel

  3. Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia

    Gang Li

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Ghosal, A.K., Roychowdhury, D. (2023). Non-malleable Codes from Authenticated Encryption in Split-State Model. In: Prabhu, S., Pokhrel, S.R., Li, G. (eds) Applications and Techniques in Information Security . ATIS 2022. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1804. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2264-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2264-2_2

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  • Print ISBN: 978-981-99-2263-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-99-2264-2

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