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A Better MixColumns Matrix to AES Against Differential Fault Analysis Attack

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Applications and Techniques in Information Security (ATIS 2022)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1804))

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Abstract

The most widely used block cipher AES, is vulnerable against side channel attacks only. An attacker can mount Differential Fault Analysis attack on AES to find the secret key. In literature, it is shown that AES key can be recovered by forming a system of linear equations with a pair of faulty and fault free ciphertexts with an exhaustive search of \(2^{32}\), which is further improved to \(2^{8}\). Ghosal et al. strengthens the security of AES to \(2^{84} \) with an additional diffusion layer. In this work, we propose two different MixColumns like matrices to the AES block cipher that secures the cipher against Differential Fault Analysis attacks. The attack complexity is increased to \(2^{116}\) with our proposed matrix.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, IIT Kharagpur, Kharagpur, India

    Anit Kumar Ghosal

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  1. Anit Kumar Ghosal
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Correspondence to Anit Kumar Ghosal .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Manipal Academy of Higher Education, Karnataka, India

    Srikanth Prabhu

  2. Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Shiva Raj Pokhrel

  3. Deakin University, Burwood, VIC, Australia

    Gang Li

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Ghosal, A.K. (2023). A Better MixColumns Matrix to AES Against Differential Fault Analysis Attack. In: Prabhu, S., Pokhrel, S.R., Li, G. (eds) Applications and Techniques in Information Security . ATIS 2022. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1804. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2264-2_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-2264-2_5

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  • Online ISBN: 978-981-99-2264-2

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