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Efficient Updatable Public-Key Encryption from Lattices

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Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2023 (ASIACRYPT 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14442))

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Abstract

Updatable public key encryption has recently been introduced as a solution to achieve forward-security in the context of secure group messaging without hurting efficiency, but so far, no efficient lattice-based instantiation of this primitive is known.

In this work, we construct the first LWE-based UPKE scheme with polynomial modulus-to-noise rate, which is CPA-secure in the standard model. At the core of our security analysis is a generalized reduction from the standard LWE problem to (a stronger version of) the Extended LWE problem. We further extend our construction to achieve stronger security notions by proposing two generic transforms. Our first transform allows to obtain CCA security in the random oracle model and adapts the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to the UPKE setting. Our second transform allows to achieve security against malicious updates by adding a NIZK argument in the update mechanism. In the process, we also introduce the notion of Updatable Key Encapsulation Mechanism (UKEM), as the updatable variant of KEMs. Overall, we obtain a CCA-secure UKEM in the random oracle model whose ciphertext sizes are of the same order of magnitude as that of CRYSTALS-Kyber.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Michael Rosenberg for pointing out a flaw in a prior version of this work. The first author is funded by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (Pôle de Recherche CYBER). This work was supported by the France 2030 ANR Project ANR-22-PECY-003 SecureCompute and the France 2030 ANR Project ANR-22-PETQ-0008 PQ-TLS.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ENS de Lyon, Lyon, France

    Calvin Abou Haidar, Alain Passelègue & Damien Stehlé

  2. INRIA, Paris, France

    Calvin Abou Haidar & Alain Passelègue

  3. CryptoLab Inc, Lyon, France

    Alain Passelègue & Damien Stehlé

Authors
  1. Calvin Abou Haidar
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  2. Alain Passelègue
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  3. Damien Stehlé
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Correspondence to Calvin Abou Haidar .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore

    Jian Guo

  2. Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

    Ron Steinfeld

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Abou Haidar, C., Passelègue, A., Stehlé, D. (2023). Efficient Updatable Public-Key Encryption from Lattices. In: Guo, J., Steinfeld, R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2023. ASIACRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14442. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8733-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-8733-7_11

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