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# SEMPER - Secure Electronic Marketplace for Europe



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#### Foreword

Some years ago, businesses could choose whether to migrate to electronic commerce, however, today it seems they have no choice. Predictions indicate that companies that do not make the necessary changes will be overrun by competition and ultimately fail. Therefore, we see more and more companies undergoing tremendous transformation in order to adapt to the new business paradigm. At the same time new companies are being established. One thing these companies have in common is the increased dependency on security technology. The invention of electronic commerce has changed the role of security technologies from being merely a protector to being also an enabler of electronic commerce, and it is clear that the development of security technology is a key enabler in the growth and deployment of electronic commerce. This has been recognised at European level (European Union 1997e).

The launch of a comprehensive EU policy in the area of security in open networks is fairly recent with the adoption of a Communication on cryptography in October 1997 (European Union 1997c). A very important complement and support to the European policy is the European Commission's contribution to overcome technological barriers by giving special importance to R&D (Research and Development) activities.

The SEMPER project was launched in September 1995 and was funded partly by the European Community within the Advanced Communication Technologies and Services (ACTS) specific research programme part of the Fourth Framework Program (1994-1998). In this book the SEMPER project team presents in a coherent, integrated, and readable form the issues addressed, the motivation for the work carried out, and the key results obtained.

SEMPER is an innovative project in several aspects. What really makes it innovative and impressive is the integration of the following components into an overall security framework for electronic commerce:

- SEMPER is the first project aiming at securing electronic commerce as a whole by developing a technical security framework realised as a middleware. This brings forward two advantages. First, such a technical security framework supports multiple business scenarios by providing powerful security services to applications implementing the business processes. A novelty compared to other security middleware is the provision of security mechanisms through a more commerce-oriented application programming

- interface. Second, the development environment shields application designers from the security implementation details and their evolution over time.
- SEMPER provides an open security platform which can be configured with relevant modules in order to cope with national regulations.
- A trustworthy user interface, TINGUIN, which ensures that users can securely manage information. TINGUIN provides a single point of interaction between users and their secure platform. Such a single interface is essential to ensure users' consistent perception of their security.
- SEMPER has proposed a legal framework for establishing legal predictability of electronic commerce. An interesting result is the adaptation of the technical and legal frameworks to each other by enabling the user's tools to visualize important legal aspects and to manage legal parameters.

The results in this book constitute a major contribution to the development of secure electronic commerce and the work presented has set the scene for future directions in secure electronic commerce. The last chapter of the book highlights some open problems related to the work done by the project. However, many more exist and there is still a lot to be done before the goal of secure electronic commerce will be reached. This has been recognised at European level, and the security-related R&D activities will be intensified under the new 5th Framework Program (1998–2002). Within the 5th Framework Program, the Information Society Technology (IST) Programme addresses the technologies of the online world.

Everyone interested in investigating the state of the art and future directions for secure electronic commerce should find this book extremely valuable and it is without any reservation that I strongly recommend it.

May 2000

Spyros Konidaris European Commission Director a.i. – DG XIII-F

#### **Preface**

Since the invention of the World-Wide Web (WWW) in 1991, Internet-based electronic commerce has been transformed from a mere idea into reality. Customers browse through catalogues, search for best offers, order goods, and pay for them electronically. Information services can be subscribed online, and many newspapers and scientific journals are readable via the Internet. Most financial institutions have some sort of online presence, allowing their customers to access and manage their accounts, make financial transactions, trade stocks, and so on. Some countries already support filing tax declarations electronically. Electronic mails are exchanged within and between enterprises and often already replace fax copies. Soon there will be no enterprise left without some Internet presence, if only for advertisement reasons. In early 1998 more than 2 million web servers were connected to the Internet, and more than 30 million host computers (Zakon 1998). Internet business is estimated to have reached \$50 to \$100 billion in 1998, mostly in business-to-business trade, and continues to increase at a high rate of growth (Henry, Cooke, Buckley, Dumagan, Gill, Pastore, and LaPorte 1999).

Thus, doing some electronic business on the Internet is already an easy task. As is cheating and snooping. Several reasons contribute to this insecurity. The Internet does not offer much security per se. Eavesdropping and acting under false identity is simple. Stealing data is undetectable in most cases. Popular PC operating systems offer little or no security against viruses and other malicious software, which means that users cannot even trust the information displayed on their own screens. At the same time, user awareness of security risks is threateningly low.

The only well-accepted security tool for the World-Wide Web is the Secure Sockets Layer protocol (SSL), which provides a secure pipe between web client and web server (Freier, Karlton, and Kocher 1996). It cannot generate signed messages or signed receipts, which naturally makes it unsuitable to tasks like electronic online payments and contract signing. And even for SSL, the problem of visualizing security to the user is unsolved: most WWW browsers only distinguish between "secure" and "insecure" connections, but do not tell the users in a simple way with whom exactly they are communicating over an established "secure" channel.

Such user interface problems are amplified by the fact that today's electronic-commerce systems offer little support in maintaining consistency in data and security among the different parts of a business process. As in the paper world, users have to fill in the same data again and again, copy data on several forms, accumulate data from different transactions by hand, and so on. More problems are revealed if one looks at the legal aspects: often it is not clear—or not even decided—who bears liability and which country's law is applicable in a specific situation.

In 1994 we, the *SEMPER* consortium, came up with the idea that all these security problems could best be solved by grouping all necessary security technologies under a coherent and open software framework, and a single, consistent user interface. Such a framework should allow automatic linking of parts of a business process. Necessarily, it should support not only secure communication and payments, but also the negotiation of business and security parameters, fair exchange of documents (as in contract signing and certified mail), handling of disputes among the parties, etc. Besides keeping data confidential, it should also grant its users some degree of anonymity and unobservability—like users on physical marketplaces can act anonymously. All this should be based on requirements from the market, and should be consistent with the legal systems.

The idea was turned into a proposal to the European Commission, with the result that we started work on implementing this idea in September 1995. We concluded the project early 1999. Some partners are currently exploiting parts of *SEMPER*, but we also aim at more complete use of the framework in successor projects and products. This book summarizes our main results.

Part I gives an overview of our solutions, i.e., the technical framework and a proposal how to tackle the open legal questions. This part is intended to be readable by everyone, i.e., it does not presuppose a specific technical background except some basic familiarity with the Internet.

Part II covers topics for which fundamentally new scientific or engineering results were obtained, and looking at them in detail would be beneficial to everybody working in the field. See the introduction of Part II for more details.

The results of *SEMPER*, including the full architecture, prototype description, and results from expert surveys and trial evaluations, are documented in a number of public, formal deliverables. These are available online from http://www.semper.org, or by writing to: IBM Zurich Research Laboratory, Computer Science Department/Project *SEMPER*, Säumerstrasse 4, CH-8803 Rüschlikon, Switzerland.

May 2000

Gérard Lacoste Birgit Pfitzmann Michael Steiner Michael Waidner

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