Negotiation based on constraints in cooperation

Abstract

This paper presents some aspects of cooperation in organizations. In the first part, we present the importance to coordination processes within an organization. Indeed, the information perceived by the company no longer pertains to the realm of the repetitive, predictable and programmable. In this context of limited rationality, how can one define an efficient and acceptable decision coordination and distribution structure? We argue that the intervention of man in the decisional process remains inescapable on account of the limitations of the coordination process, and define several forms of cooperation between decision centers on an industrial site.

In the second part, the assumption retained is that for the management of a production system the decision is made through a network of decision centers. The approach presented puts forward the development of decision and cooperation aid tools only exploiting the information contained in the constraints linking together the decision variables so as to highlight the degrees of freedom effectively available to the decision maker. Finally, we discuss about cooperation and power, where the power issue cannot be disregarded.