Modal logic as metalogic

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to show how modal logic may be conceived as recording the derived rules of a logical system in the system itself. This conception of modal logic was propounded by Dana Scott in the early seventies. Here, similar ideas are pursued in a context less classical than Scott's.

First a family of propositional logical systems is considered, which is obtained by gradually adding structural rules to a variant of the nonassociative Lambek calculus. In this family one finds systems that correspond to the associative Lambek calculus, linear logic, relevant logics, BCK logic and intuitionistic logic. Above these basic systems, sequent systems parallel to the basic systems are constructed, which formalize various notions of derived rules for the basic systems. The deduction theorem is provable for the basic systems if, and only if, they are at least as strong as systems corresponding to linear logic, or BCK logic, depending on the language, and their deductive metalogic is not stronger than they are.

However, though we do not always have the deduction theorem, we may always obtain a modal analogue of the deduction theorem for conservative modal extensions of the basic systems. Modal postulates which are necessary and sufficient for that are postulates of S4 plus modal postulates which mimic structural rules. For example, the modal postulates which Girard has recently considered in linear logic are necessary and sufficient for the modal analogue of the deduction theorem.

All this may lead towards results about functional completeness in categories. When functional completeness, which is analogous to the deduction theorem, fails, we may perhaps envisage a modal analogue of functional completeness in a modal category, of which our original category is a full subcategory.