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Mathematical instrumentalism meets the conjunction objection

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Abstract

Scientific realists often appeal to some version of the conjunction objection to argue that scientific instrumentalism fails to do justice to the full empirical import of scientific theories. Whereas the conjunction objection provides a powerful critique of scientific instrumentalism, I will show that mathematical instrumentalism escapes the conjunction objection unscathed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 73019-0535, Norman, OK, USA

    James Hawthorne

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  1. James Hawthorne
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Hawthorne, J. Mathematical instrumentalism meets the conjunction objection. J Philos Logic 25, 363–397 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00249665

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00249665

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