Skip to main content
Log in

Theory contraction through base contraction

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Alchourron, C. and D.Makinson (1985), “On the logic of theory change: safe contractions”, Studia Logica, 44, pp. 405–422.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alchourron, C., P.Gärdenfors, and D.Makinson (1985), “On the logic of theory change: partial meet functions for contraction and revision”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50, pp. 510–530.

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins, J. (1988), “Belief, desire and revision” Mind, 98, pp. 333–342.

    Google Scholar 

  • deKleer, J. (1986), “An assumption-based TMS”, Artificial Intelligence, 28, pp. 127–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doyle, J. (1979), “A truth maintenance system”, Artificial Intelligence, 12, pp. 231–272.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dunn, J. M. (1986), “Relevance logic and entailment”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, ed. D.Gabbay and F.Guenthner, vol. 3, pp. 117–224, Dordrecht (Reidel).

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuhrmann, A. (1990), “On multiple contractions”, forthcoming.

  • Fuhrmann, A. (1989), “Reflective modalities and theory change”, Synthese, 81, pp. 115–134.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. (1986), “Belief revisions and the Ramsey test for conditionals”, Philosophical Review, 95, pp. 81–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. (1987), “Variations on the Ramsey test: more triviality results”, Studia Logica, 46, pp. 319–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. (1988), Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States, Cambridge (MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärdenfors, P. (1990), “The dynamics of belief systems: foundations vs. coherence theories”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie.

  • Gärdenfors, P. and D.Makinson (1988), “Revisions of Knowledge systems and epistemic entrenchment”, in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, ed. by M. Y.Vardi, Los Altos, Cal. (Morgan Kaufmann).

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, G. (1986), Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass. (MIT Press).

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi, I. (1977), “Subjunctives, dispositions and chances”, Synthese, 34, pp. 423–455.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi, I. (1988), “Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test”, Synthese, 76, pp. 49–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindström, S. and W.Rabinowicz (1989), “On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic belief revision”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 18, pp. 69–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Makinson, D. (1985), “How to give it up: a survey of some formal aspects of the logic of theory change”, Synthese, 62, pp. 347–363.

    Google Scholar 

  • Makinson, D. (1987), “On the status of the postulate for recovery in the logic of theory change”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 16, pp. 383–394.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martins, J. and S.Shapiro (1986), “Theoretical foundations for belief revision”, in Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, pp. 383–398, Los Altos (Morgan Kaufmann).

    Google Scholar 

  • Segerberg, K. (1986), “On the logic of small changes in theories I”, Acta Philosophica Fennica.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Fuhrmann, A. Theory contraction through base contraction. J Philos Logic 20, 175–203 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00284974

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00284974

Keywords

Navigation