Abstract
There is the idea that rational belief for a single individual can be constructed via a process of unilateral argument. To preempt antipathy between the AI communities that can claim the idea that rational belief can be so constructed, we trace the idea to the beginning of this century, to Keynes' dispute with Russell over logic and probability. We review how Keynesian ideas were revived in AI's work on non-monotonic reasoning and parallel developments in philosophical logic.
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Originally given at the AAAI Spring Symposium on Argument and Belief, 1991 in a slightly different form. Intended to preempt dispute among AI subgroups over who had first discovered the idea of reasoning based on argument, it is presented here as an historical reflection. Editor's Note: The idea of reasoning based upon argument appears to have originated with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, if not the pre-Socratic philosophers beginning with Thales.
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Loui, R.P. Argument and belief: Where we stand in the Keynesian tradition. Minds and Machines 1, 357–365 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00352915
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00352915