Abstract
This paper provides a logic framework for investigations of game theoretical problems. We adopt an infinitary extension of classical predicate logic as the base logic of the framework. The reason for an infinitary extension is to express the common knowledge concept explicitly. Depending upon the choice of axioms on the knowledge operators, there is a hierarchy of logics. The limit case is an infinitary predicate extension of modal propositional logic KD4, and is of special interest in applications. In Part I, we develop the basic framework, and show some applications: an epistemic axiomatization of Nash equilibrium and formal undecidability on the playability of a game. To show the formal undecidability, we use a term existence theorem, which will be proved in Part II.
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The authors thank Hiroakira Ono for helpful discussions and encouragements from the early stage of this research project, and Philippe Mongin, Mitio Takano and a referee of this journal for comments on earlier versions of this paper. The first and second authors are partially supported, respectively, by Tokyo Center of Economic Research and Grant-in-Aids for Scientific Research 04640215, Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.
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Kaneko, M., Nagashima, T. Game logic and its applications I. Stud Logica 57, 325–354 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370838
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370838