Abstract
This paper explores a modal analogue of Hugh Mellor's version of McTaggart's argument against the reality of tense. I show that if Mellor's argument succeeds in showing that the present moment cannot be any more real than any other moment then it also shows that the actual world cannot be any more real than any other possible world.
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Cresswell, M.J. Modality and Mellor's McTaggart. Stud Logica 49, 163–170 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935595
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935595