The “explicit-implicit” distinction

Abstract

Much of traditional AI exemplifies the “explicit representation” paradigm, and during the late 1980's a heated debate arose between the classical and connectionist camps as to whether beliefs and rules receive an explicit or implicit representation in human cognition. In a recent paper, Kirsh (1990) questions the coherence of the fundamental distinction underlying this debate. He argues that our basic intuitions concerning ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ representations are not only confused but inconsistent. Ultimately, Kirsh proposes a new formulation of the distinction, based upon the criterion ofconstant time processing.

The present paper examines Kirsh's claims. It is argued that Kirsh fails to demonstrate that our usage of ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ is seriously confused or inconsistent. Furthermore, it is argued that Kirsh's new formulation of the explicit-implicit distinction is excessively stringent, in that it banishes virtually all sentences of natural language from the realm of explicit representation. By contrast, the present paper proposes definitions for ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ which preserve most of our strong intuitions concerning straightforward uses of these terms. It is also argued that the distinction delineated here sustains the meaningfulness of the abovementioned debate between classicists and connectionists.