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Reversing the Levi identity

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Abstract

The AGM (Alchourrón-GÄrdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that arenot closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that onefirst adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an intuitively plausible way of revising one's beliefs. Since it typically involves the temporary acceptance of an inconsistent set of beliefs, it can only be used in belief representations that distinguish between different inconsistent sets of belief.

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Authors
  1. Sven Ove Hansson
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Hansson, S.O. Reversing the Levi identity. J Philos Logic 22, 637–669 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01054039

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