Abstract
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) and McLaughlin (1993) challenge connectionists to explain systematicity without simply implementing a classical architecture. In this paper I argue that what makes the challenge difficult for connectionists to meet has less to do with what is to be explained than with what is to count as an explanation. Fodor et al. are prepared to admit as explanatory, accounts of a sort that only classical models can provide. If connectionists are to meet the challenge, they are going to have to insist on the propriety of changing what counts as an explanation of systematicity. Once that is done, there would seem to be as yet no reason to suppose that connectionists are unable to explain systematicity.
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Shorter versions of this paper were presented at the 1993 annual meetings of both the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the Society for Philosophy and Psychology. The paper has benefited from the comments and criticisms of Frances Egan, David Chalmers, Terry Horgan, Brian McLaughlin, Tim van Gelder and Ted Warfield.
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Matthews, R.J. Three-concept monte: Explanation, implementation and systematicity. Synthese 101, 347–363 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063894
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063894