Abstract
In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.
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Kvart, I. Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, true premises, and knowledge. Synthese 100, 133–164 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063923
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063923