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Non zero-sum stochastic games in admission, service and routing control in queueing systems

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate situations of non-cooperative dynamic control of queueing systems by two agents, having different objectives. The main part of the paper is devoted to analyzing a problem of an admission and a service (vacation) control. The admission controller has to decide whether to allow arrivals to occur. Once the queue empties, the server goes on vacation, and controls the vacations duration (according to the state and past history of the queue). The immediate costs for each controller are increasing in the number of customers, but no convexity assumptions are made. The controllers are shown to have a stationary equilibrium policy pair, for which each controller uses a stationary threshold type policy with randomization in at most one state. We then investigate a problem of a non-zero sum stochastic game between a router into several queues, and a second controller that allocates some extra service capacity to one of the queues. We establish the equilibrium of a policy pair for which the router uses the intuitive “Join the shortest queue” policy.

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Altman, E. Non zero-sum stochastic games in admission, service and routing control in queueing systems. Queueing Syst 23, 259–279 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01206560

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