Abstract
We investigate a cooperative game with two types of players envolved: Every player of the first type owns a unit size bin, and every player of the second type owns an item of size at most one. The value of a coalition of players is defined to be the maximum overall size of packed items over all packings of the items owned by the coalition into the bins owned by the coalition.
We prove that forε=1/3 this cooperative bin packing game isε-balanced in the taxation model of Faigle and Kern (1993).
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References
Faigle U, Kern W (1993) On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games. ZOR 38:141–152
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This research was supported by the Christian Doppler Laboratorium für Diskrete Optimierung.
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Woeginger, G.J. On the rate of taxation in a cooperative bin packing game. ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research 42, 313–324 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01432507
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01432507