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Deontic logic as founded on nonmonotonic logic

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Abstract

Ever since its inception in the work of von Wright, deontic logic has been developed primarily as a species of modal logic. I argue in this paper, however, that the techniques of nonmonotonic logic may provide a better theoretical framework — at least for the formalization of commensense normative reasoning — than the usual modal treatment. After reviewing some standard approaches to deontic logic, I focus on two areas in which nonmonotonic techniques promise improved understanding: reasoning in the presence of conflicting obligations, and reasoning with conditional obligations.

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Horty, J.F. Deontic logic as founded on nonmonotonic logic. Ann Math Artif Intell 9, 69–91 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01531262

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