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Towards a formal theory of defeasible deontic conditionals

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Abstract

The paper outlines the approach to the analysis of deontic conditionals taken in earlier work of Jones and Pörn, comparing it briefly with two main trends within dyadic deontic logic, and discussing problems associated with the augmentation principle and the factual detachment principle. A modification of the Jones and Pörn system is then presented, using a classical but not normal (in the sense of Chellas) deontic modality, to provide the basis for an alternative analysis of deontic conditionals. This new analysis validates neither the factual detachment nor the augmentation principles. However, influenced by the approach of Delgrande to default reasoning, it is shown how a restricted form of factual detachment might be accommodated within the revised system.

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References

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Author notes

  1. Andrew J. I. Jones

    Present address: Inst. for rettsinformatikk, Niels Juels gate 16, N-0272, Oslo, Norway

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Norwegian Research Centre for Computers and Law, University of Oslo, N-0272, Oslo, Norway

    Andrew J. I. Jones

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  1. Andrew J. I. Jones
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Jones, A.J.I. Towards a formal theory of defeasible deontic conditionals. Ann Math Artif Intell 9, 151–166 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01531265

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01531265

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