Abstract
The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. In this paper, we present a set of sufficient conditions on the preference lists of any given stable matching instance, under which the optimality of the original male optimal stable matching is still preserved.
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Kuo, R.T., Tseng, S.S. On the invariance of male optimal stable matching. BIT 30, 592–598 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01933208
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01933208