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Allocation of research funds in competitive environment. A computerized negotiation system

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Abstract

The paper is concerned with the problem of financing of complex research programs. One of tasks to be solved consists in assigning research teams, willing to participate in a given program, to research projects being its elements, under conditions of constrained budget. It is assumed that the strategy of every research team head is to maximize the average time-discounted income per person. In the previous paper of the authors a special negotiation procedure has been proposed to solve this problem. This paper presents some possible extensions and modifications of the procedure. At each stage of this procedure the heads of research teams involved have to make decisions on the assignment of their workers to particular projects. The proposed system of interactions among the research teams heads provides a possibility of reaching the consensus in the matter of this assignment. Simultaneously, it makes possible to solve the problem of research funds allocation. Such a system is considered as a multiperson game of Nash type with the non-zero sum of the players payments.

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Jakubowski, A., Kulikowski, R. & Wagner, D. Allocation of research funds in competitive environment. A computerized negotiation system. Scientometrics 12, 179–196 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02016291

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