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Knowledge and best responses in games

  • Section II Game Theoretic Approaches To Multi-Person Decision Making
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Abstract

Processes of iterated elimination of strategies that are not best responses are studied. Some suggestions are made about how rational players may use their mutual knowledge about game and behavior.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Ordona 21, 01-237, Warsaw, Poland

    S. Ambroszkiewicz

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  1. S. Ambroszkiewicz
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Additional information

This work was supported by KBN Grant No. 210979101.

My thanks are due to Professor J. Łoś for inspiration.

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Ambroszkiewicz, S. Knowledge and best responses in games. Ann Oper Res 51, 61–71 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02032667

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02032667

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