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Pollution control: A differential game approach

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Abstract

Transnational pollution is formulated as a differential game between two sovereign governments. The symmetric open loop Nash equilibrium is shown to yield more pollution than in a cooperative solution. A model of Stackelberg leadership in pollution control is also investigated. The possibility of limit cycles is illustrated, using bifurcation theory.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street West, H3A 2T7, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

    N. V. Long

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  1. N. V. Long
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Long, N.V. Pollution control: A differential game approach. Ann Oper Res 37, 283–296 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02071061

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02071061

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