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Bankruptcy games

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Abstract

Bankruptcy problems are considered from a game theoretic point of view. Solution concepts from cooperative game theory are studied for bankruptcy games. A necessary and sufficient condition for a division rule for bankruptcy problems to be a game theoretic rule is given. A new division rule which is an adjustment of the proportional rule is given. This rule coincides with theT-value for bankruptcy games. Properties of the new rule are treated and a set of characterizing properties is given.

Zusammenfassung

In dieser Arbeit werden Bankrottprobleme von spieltheoretischer Warte aus behandelt; insbesondere werden Lösungskonzepte der kooperativen Spieltheorie für „Bankrottspiele“ untersucht. Eine notwendige und hinreichende Bedingung wird angegeben dafür, Daß eine Aufteilungsregel für Bankrottprobleme spieltheoretischer Natur ist. Ferner wird eine neue Aufteilungsregel angegeben, welche eine passende Modellierung der Proportionalitätsregel ist. Diese Regel fällt mit demτ-Wert für Bankrottspiele zusammen. Schließlich werden Eigenschaften dieser neuen Regel untersucht und eine Axiomatisierung angegeben.

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Curiel, I.J., Maschler, M. & Tijs, S.H. Bankruptcy games. Zeitschrift für Operations Research 31, A143–A159 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02109593

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