Skip to main content
Log in

An efficient characterization of some cost allocation solutions associated with capacitated network design problems

  • Published:
Telecommunication Systems Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We analyze some game-theoretic solution concepts associated with a cost allocation problem arising from the Capacitated Network Design (CND) problem. The problem is formulated as a cost cooperative game in characteristic function form to be referred to as the CND game. We provide an efficient representation of several game-theoretic solution concepts associated with the CND game. In particular, we efficiently characterize the core, and in some cases the nucleolus, the least weightedε-core and a certain “central” point in the least weightedε-core. Our model properly generalizes several previously studied cooperative games. We also employ our model to analyze cost allocation problems associated with several classes of network design problems, which were not previously studied in the literature. Specifically, we efficiently characterize the above cost allocation solutions for cost allocation problems associated with the Capacitated Concentrator Location problem, the Capacitated Minimum Spanning Tree problem, the Capacitated Fixed Cost Spanning Forest problem, and the Capacitated Steiner Tree problem.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. C. Bird, On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A gane theoretic approach, Networks 6(1976)335–350.

    Google Scholar 

  2. A. Charnes and K.O. Kortanek, On a class of convex and non-Archimedean solution concepts forw-person games, System Research Memoradum No. 172, Technological Institute, Northwestern University (1967).

  3. A. Charnes and K.O. Kortanek, On classes of convex and preemptive nuclei forw-person games, in:Proc. Princeton Symp. on Mathematical Programming, ed. H.W. Kuhn (Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 377–390.

  4. T. Driessen,Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications (Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 1988).

    Google Scholar 

  5. M.R. Garey and D.S. Johnson,Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness (Freeman, San Francisco, 1979).

    Google Scholar 

  6. B. Gavish, Augmented Lagrangian based algorithms for centralized network design, IEEE Trans. Commun. COM-33(1985)1247–1257.

    Google Scholar 

  7. A.M. Geoffriun and R. McBride, Lagrangian relaxation applied to capacitated facility location problems, AIIE Trans. 10(1978)40–47.

    Google Scholar 

  8. J.H. Grotte, Computation of an observations on the nucleolus and the central games, M.Sc. Thesis, Cornell University (1970).

  9. D. Granot and F. Granot, Computational complexity of a cost allocation approach to a fixed cost spanning forest problem, Math. Oper. Res. 17(1992)765–780.

    Google Scholar 

  10. D. Granot and G. Huberman, Minimum cost spanning tree games, Math. Progr. 21(1981)1–18.

    Google Scholar 

  11. D. Granot and G. Huberman, On the core and nucleolus of M.C.S.T. games, Math. Progr. 29(1984)323–347.

    Google Scholar 

  12. M.A. Keane, Some topics inn-person game theory, Ph.D. Dissertation, Mathematics Department, Northwestern University (1969).

  13. A. Kolen, Solving covering problems and the uncapacitated plant location problem on trees, Euro. J. Oper. Res. 12(1983)266–278.

    Google Scholar 

  14. A. Kolen and A. Tamir, Covering problems, in:Discrete Location Theory, eds. P.B. Michandani and R.L. Francis (Wiley, 1990) Ch. 6.

  15. A. Kopelowitz, Computation of the kernels of simple games and the nucleolus ofn-person games, Research Memoradum No. 31, Department of Mathematics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (1967).

    Google Scholar 

  16. S.C. Littlechild, A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case, Int. J. Game Theory 3(1974)21–29.

    Google Scholar 

  17. M. Machler, B. Peleg and L.S. Shapley, Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus and relation solution concepts, Math. Oper. Res. 4(1979)303–338.

    Google Scholar 

  18. N. Megiddo, Computational complexity of the game theory approach to cost allocation for a tree, Math. Oper. Res. 3(1978)189–196.

    Google Scholar 

  19. A. Mirzaian, Lagrangian relaxation of the start-star concentrator location problem: Approximation algorithm and bounds, Networks 15(1985)1–20.

    Google Scholar 

  20. R.M. Nauss, An improved algorithm for the capacitated facility location problem, J. Oper. Res. Soc. 29(1978)1195–1202.

    Google Scholar 

  21. H. Pirkul, Efficient algorithms for the capacitated concentrator location problem, Comp. Oper. Res. 14(1987)197–208.

    Google Scholar 

  22. D. Schmeidler, The nucleolus of a characteristic function game, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17(1969)1163–1170.

    Google Scholar 

  23. W.W. Sharkey, Economic and game-theoretic issues associated with cost allocation in a telecommunication network, in:Cost Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications, ed. H.P. Young (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1985) Ch. 8.

    Google Scholar 

  24. D. Skorin-Kapov, On a cost allocation problem arising from a capacitated concentrator covering problem, Oper. Res. Lett. 13(1993)315–323.

    Google Scholar 

  25. D. Skorin-Kapov, On the core of the minimum Steiner tree game in networks, Technical Report, Harriman School for Management, SUNY at Stony Brook (1993).

    Google Scholar 

  26. D. Skorin-Kapov and H.F. Beltrán, On a cost allocation problem arising from a star-star capacitated concentrator location problem, J. Comp. Inf. Tech. 2(1994)1–8.

    Google Scholar 

  27. H.P. Young,Cost Allocation: Method, Principles, Applications (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1985).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Skorin-Kapov, D., Beltrán, H.F. An efficient characterization of some cost allocation solutions associated with capacitated network design problems. Telecommunication Systems 3, 91–107 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02110045

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02110045

Keywords

Navigation