Abstract
Generally speaking, there are two types of interaction, synchronous interactions (N members interact simultaneously) and asynchronous interactions (each member interacts withN neighboring agents individually). The purpose of this paper is to consider the dynamics of the evolution of a cooperative society with synchronous interaction by focusing on the spatial size of the interaction. Asynchronous interaction is dealt with in the cumulative payoff of individual 2-interated prisoner's dilemma (2-IPD) games. The result has shown that an adequate spatial size for interaction promotes a highly cooperative society, but it gets more difficult for agents with synchronous interactions to achieve a cooperative society as it increases in size.
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Kubo, M., Sasakabe, Y. Criticality of cooperative society. Artif Life Robotics 6, 66–72 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02481211
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02481211