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A tale of two outsourcing contracts

An agency-theoretical perspective

  • WI - Schwerpunktaufsatz
  • Published:
Wirtschaftsinformatik

Abstract

This study analyzes two extreme outsourcing situations. In the first case, contractual problems derailed the original agreement and precipitated a disastrous divorce. In the second case, the strategic alliance between the firm and its suppliers was supported by governance mechanisms that paved the way to a successful and harmonious relationship. Agency theory provides a conceptual background for analyzing the cases. Lessons are drawn from the experiences of the firms studied, and recommendations are made for the design of outsourcing contracts that curb contractual opportunism.

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Aubert, B.A., Patry, M. & Rivard, S. A tale of two outsourcing contracts. Wirtschaftsinf 45, 181–190 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03250897

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