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Secrecy by typing in security protocols

  • TACS Open Lecture
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Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software (TACS 1997)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1281))

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Abstract

We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approach is based on traditional classification techniques, and extends those techniques to handle concurrent processes that use shared-key cryptography. The rules have the form of typing rules for a basic concurrent language with cryptographic primitives, the spi calculus. They guarantee that, if a protocol typechecks, then it does not leak its secret inputs.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Digital Equipment Corporation, Systems Research Center, USA

    Martín Abadi

Authors
  1. Martín Abadi
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Martín Abadi Takayasu Ito

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Abadi, M. (1997). Secrecy by typing in security protocols. In: Abadi, M., Ito, T. (eds) Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software. TACS 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1281. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0014571

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0014571

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63388-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69530-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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