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References
Cf. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1986, pp. 13–17.
See Karl R. Popper, ‘Epistemology without a Knowing Subject', in Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. by B. van Rootselaar and F. Staal, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1968, pp. 333–73; reprinted in K. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 106–152.
For these requirements, see Risto Hilpinen, ‘The Semantics of Questions and the Theory of Inquiry', Logique et Analyse 29 (1986), pp. 523–539. (See pp. 529–535.)
Recent discussion has shown that these conditions are not always sufficient for knowledge, and that additional conditions, for example, some requirement of "epistemic indefeasibility", may be necessary; see Risto Hilpinen, "Knowledge and Conditionals", in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, ed. by J. Tomberlin, Ridgeview Publ. Co., Atascadero, Ca., 1988, pp. 157–182. This requirement will be discussed below.
For the concept of the presupposition of a question, see Risto Hilpinen, "The Semantics of Questions and the Theory of Inquiry", p. 525.
For the distinction between primary and secondary questions, see Risto Hilpinen, "On Experimental Questions", in Theory and Experiment, ed. by D. Batens and J. van Bendegem, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1988, pp. 15–29.
See Gilbert Harman, Change in View, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1986.
Harman, op. cit., p. 32.
This concept of transmitted information has been discussed in Risto Hilpinen, "On the Information Provided by Observations", in Information and Inference, ed. by Jaako Hintikka and P. Suppes, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1970, pp. 97–122 (cf. pp. 115–116).
Charles S. Peirce termed these two stages the abductive stage and the inductive stage of inquiry; see The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 7, ed. by Arthur Burks, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1958, §§7.218–7.219.
Quoted from Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, "Medieval Philosophical Literature", The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. by N. Kretzmann et al., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982, p. 27. The reference is to Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones super librum de causis, ed. by A. Marlasca, Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1972, p. 35.
For a discussion of this requirement, see Risto Hilpinen, "Knowledge and Conditionals", in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, ed. by J. Tomberlin; see also note 5 above.
For the concept of a secondary question (or research question), see section III above and Risto Hilpinen, ‘On Experimental Questions', in Theory and Experiment, ed. by D. Batens and J. van Bendegem, D. Reidel, Dordrecht 1988, pp. 15–29.
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Hilpinen, R. (1991). Inquiry, argumentation and knowledge. In: Fuhrmann, A., Morreau, M. (eds) The Logic of Theory Change. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 465. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0018414
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