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Unconditional Byzantine Agreement with good majority

  • Distributed Computing
  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
STACS 91 (STACS 1991)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 480))

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Abstract

We present a protocol which achieves Byzantine Agreement (BA) if less than half of the processors are faulty and which does not rely on unproved omputational assumptions such as the unforgeability of digital signatures. This is the first protocol which achieves this level of security.

Our protocol needs reliable broadcast and secret channels in a precomputation phase. For a security parameter k, it achieves BA with an error probability exponentially small in k, whereas all computations are polynomial in k and the number of processors, n. The number of rounds is linear in k and independent of n. The length of the precomputation phase is linear in n and proportional to the number of BAs based on it.

As a subprotocol, we present a coin flipping protocol on the same assumptions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Rechnerentwurf und Fehlertoleranz, Universität Karlsruhe, Postfach 6980, D-7500, Karlsruhe 1, FRG

    Birgit Baum-Waidner, Birgit Pfitzmann & Michael Waidner

Authors
  1. Birgit Baum-Waidner
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  2. Birgit Pfitzmann
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  3. Michael Waidner
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Editor information

Christian Choffrut Matthias Jantzen

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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Baum-Waidner, B., Pfitzmann, B., Waidner, M. (1991). Unconditional Byzantine Agreement with good majority. In: Choffrut, C., Jantzen, M. (eds) STACS 91. STACS 1991. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 480. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0020806

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0020806

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53709-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47002-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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