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On the logic of theory base change

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Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA 1994)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 838))

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Abstract

Recently there has been considerable interest in change operators for theory bases, rather than entire theories. Especially since such operators could support computer-based implementations of revision systems. However, a perceived problem associated with theory base change operators is their sensitivity to the syntax of the theory base used. Although it has been argued that this sensitivity should reflect a higher level of commitment to formulae in the theory base than formulae derivable from the theory base. In this paper we develop a logic of theory base change, using constructions based on ensconcements. We show whenever two theory bases have equivalent ensconcements, the logical closure of their theory base revisions are identical. Moreover, we give explicit relationships associating theory base revision and theory base contraction, and provide explicit relationships between theory base change and theory change operations. We claim that these relationships show that our theory base revision and theory base contraction operators exhibit desirable behaviour.

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Craig MacNish David Pearce Luís Moniz Pereira

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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Williams, MA. (1994). On the logic of theory base change. In: MacNish, C., Pearce, D., Pereira, L.M. (eds) Logics in Artificial Intelligence. JELIA 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 838. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0021966

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0021966

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58332-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-48657-2

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